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 UNIDENTIFIED LEGAL OBJECT: 
CONCEPTUALISING THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
Jed Odermatt 
 
Abstract 
 
What is the European Union? This seemingly simple question gives rise to 
a multitude of different answers from EU lawyers, international lawyers, 
political scientists, and the media. The debate is as old as European integration, 
and a satisfying answer still alludes us. Does the legal characterization of the 
EU and EU law matter from a legal standpoint? This article argues that such 
characterizations do matter. It first discusses four main ways in which the EU is 
perceived in the EU law and international law literature: (i) the EU as a ‘new 
legal order’; (ii) the EU as a ‘self-contained regime’ in international law; (iii) 
the EU as a ‘Regional Economic Integration Organization’ (REIO); and (iv) the 
EU as a ‘Classic intergovernmental organization’ (Classic IO). Using examples 
from recent legal practice, this article shows how such characterizations are the 
‘starting points’ in debates which can shape legal outcomes. It is difficult to 
overcome such divergent views, however, since they represent much deeper 
disagreements and power relations. Developing a theory of EU legal character 
gives rise to new challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
What is the European Union? This seemingly simple question gives rise to 
a multitude of different answers from EU lawyers, international lawyers, 
political scientists, and the media. In 1961 McMahon wrote that “although the 
[European] Communities were brought into being in the form of an international 
treaty, one should not allow the circumstances of their birth to obscure their real 
nature…”1 What the ‘real nature’ of the EU is, however, remains a mystery. As 
is often the case with these questions, the answer still depends on whom you 
ask.2 In a recent article on the topic of ‘European Exceptionalism’, it was noted 
that “[t]he debate over whether the EU is a state, federation, international 
organization or flying saucer is as old as European integration itself.”3 The 
answer to the question ‘what kind of legal entity is the EU?’ still eludes us.4 
Do such arguments and debates matter from a legal standpoint? One might 
argue that these are purely academic questions. To the European Commission 
lawyer working on food safety standards, or the Legal Associate in London 
working on competition law, the question of what kind of legal entity the EU is 
is not really significant. This article makes the case that legal categories do 
matter. In many cases, such characterizations are the ‘starting points’ in legal 
debates, which then shape legal outcomes. As the EU seeks to play a greater role 
in the international legal order, and as one of its Member States seeks to extricate 
itself from the EU legal order, the Union, its Member States, and third states will 
be faced with legal questions that touch upon the EU’s legal nature. Developing 
a single theory of EU legal character will assist in providing legal certainty as 
new questions and problems arise. 
The article sets out four main ways in which EU has been conceptualized 
in the international law and EU law literature. The article is structured according 
to these four models: (i) the EU as a ‘new legal order’; (ii) the EU as a ‘self-
contained regime’ in international law; (iii) the EU as a ‘Regional Economic 
Integration Organization’ (REIO); and (iv) the EU as a ‘Classic 
intergovernmental organization’ (Classic IO). These four models appear in the 
table below. 
                                                                                                       
1  J. F. McMahon, The Court of the European Communities: Judicial Interpretation and 
International Organisation, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 320, 329 (1961). 
2 Martti Koskenniemi (Chairman of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law), 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) and U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702, ¶ 483 
(July 18, 2006) (“This is the background to the concern about fragmentation of international law: the 
rise of specialized rules and rule-systems that have no clear relationship to each other. Answers to 
legal questions become dependent on whom you ask, what rule-system is your focus on.”). 
3 Turkuler Isiksel, European Exceptionalism and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR, 27 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 565, 571 (2016). 
4 See generally C. Binder & J.A. Hofbauer, The Perception of the EU Legal Order in 
International Law: An In-and Outside View, 8 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 139 (2017). 
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Fig. 1 Four Models of the European Union in International Law 
 
 Internal sphere External sphere 
Unique legal 
entity; high 
degree of 
autonomy 
 
1. ‘New Legal Order’ 
 
• EU has developed into a 
‘new’ type of legal/political 
entity of a constitutional 
nature  
 
 
3. ‘Regional Economic 
Integration Organization’ 
(REIO) 
 
• EU is a ‘special type’ of 
international organization  
• Specialized rules are required to 
take into account its nature and 
autonomy 
 
Fits within 
existing 
categories; 
low degree of 
autonomy 
 
2. ‘Self-contained Regime’ 
 
• EU is a part of international 
legal order, but has 
developed specialised 
internal rules 
 
 
‘Classic’ International 
Organization 
 
• EU is not qualitatively different 
from other international 
organizations 
• Existing rules can be applied to 
the EU 
 
The first view reflects the EU’s own self-perception, that of the EU as a ‘new 
legal order’ or even a ‘sui generis’ entity. The second model is that of a ‘self-
contained regime’ in international law, a legal system that remains a part of the 
international legal order but has for the most part developed specialized internal 
rules. The third model views the EU international organization, albeit one with 
special unique features, commonly described as a regional economic integration 
organization (‘REIO’). The fourth model views the EU as a traditional 
intergovernmental organization, or ‘classical’ IO, that is not qualitatively different 
from other IOs.  Each of these models is explained, analysed and debated in more 
detail in the following section. 
The four models differ with respect to a number of assumptions about the EU 
and its relationship with international law. The four models are placed on two axes. 
The first relates to the extent to which the EU is viewed as a ‘unique’ entity in 
international law. Debates about what kind of entity the EU is often revolve around 
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this question of uniqueness. The ‘New Legal Order’ model and the ‘REIO’ model 
both assume that there is something special about the EU, which sets it apart from 
other legal entities. The ‘Self-contained regime’ model and ‘Classic IO’ model both 
see the EU as something that fits within existing international law categories; they 
either deny that the EU is unique at all, or reject that any legal consequences should 
flow from its unique features. The second axis relates to the ‘sphere’ that is 
concerned, either from the perspective of the internal legal order of the EU, or from 
the perspective of the EU’s place within the wider international legal order. The 
‘New legal order’ and ‘self-contained regime’ models are mostly concerned with the 
relationship between the EU and the Member States and are less concerned about the 
EU’s relationship with other entities (internal sphere). The ‘REIO’ and ‘Classic IO’ 
model focus on the EU’s relationship with the wider world of international law 
(external sphere). 
It should be stressed that these four models are not mutually exclusive. In 
practice, one’s conception of the EU may combine elements of these models or lie 
in between categories. Nor does the table seek to answer the vexed question of what 
type of legal entity the EU is. Rather, the four models highlight the different 
conceptions of the EU that we find in the legal literature, case law, and international 
legal practice. The four models are ideal types; few would subscribe fully to any of 
these models. While the CJEU and many EU lawyers gravitate towards the ‘new 
legal order’ model, their views are much more nuanced in reality. Likewise, even 
international lawyers who subscribe to the ‘Classic IO’ model would accept that the 
EU possesses certain characteristics that set apart from other IOs. 
The reason for highlighting these four models is to illustrate the various 
conceptual ‘starting points’ that lawyers take when addressing legal questions 
dealing with the EU’s place in international law. The article demonstrates how the 
legal outcome in different scenarios have been shaped by the assumptions associated 
with each of these models. In order to illustrate this, I rely on a number of examples 
from recent legal practice where the legal character of the EU played a role in 
determining the legal outcome. The examples discussed in the following sections 
include, among others, Opinion 2/13 regarding the EU’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights; the Miller litigation on the invocation of Article 50 
TEU; the EU’s practice before the International Law Commission, in particular 
during work on the responsibility of international organizations; and the EU’s 
participation in international organizations and international dispute settlement 
mechanisms. In each of these instances, the legal outcome was shaped, at least in 
part, by these ‘starting points’ and the deeper conceptual understandings about the 
nature of the EU and EU law. 
The different models in this article emerged from a review of international law 
and EU law literature. Although debates about the nature of the EU exist in 
international relations literature, this article restricts itself to the legal scholarship. IR 
scholars seem to have less problem with the multiple-nature of the EU, and can study 
it as a type of international organization, proto-state or federation. 5  Legal 
scholarship, on the other hand, appears to have more difficulty with such 
characterisations, since legal characteristics often lead to legal consequences. 
                                                                                                             
5 For an overview of this discussion, see William Phelan, What Is Sui Generis About the European 
Union? Costly International Cooperation in a Self-Contained Regime, 14 INT’L STUD. REV. 367 (2012). 
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A. Divergent Approaches 
The United States of America, Botswana, Russia and Palau differ in terms of 
culture, language, military power, economic development, and legal systems, but we 
agree that they have at least one thing in common: they are all recognized as States 
in international law. However, there is no such consensus when it comes to the legal 
character of the European Union, however. How can it be that the EU (and its 
previous incarnations) has existed for over sixty years, but there is still no consensus 
among lawyers about how such a strange legal entity is to be identified? 
One reason for the divergent views is academic specialisation. The topic is 
approached from different angles and academic fields. Public international lawyers, 
while not necessarily ignoring the European Union, often fail to engage in serious 
discussion about the EU’s place within the international legal order. The EU and EU 
law is therefore often viewed as a separate, specialised field of study, and 
international lawyers are often reluctant to enter this terrain. Another reason is 
complexity. The EU, viewed by some as a complicated byzantine structure, is 
considered too complex and too specialised to be discussed seriously without in-
depth knowledge of the EU and its institutions. This can also be explained in part by 
the ‘managerial approach’ to international law, which renders international law 
scholarship increasingly compartmentalised. Koskenniemi describes this approach: 
What is significant about projects such as trade, human rights, or 
indeed “Europe”, is precisely the set of values or purposes that we 
link with them. To be doing “trade law” or “human rights law”, or 
“environmental law” or “European law” – as the representatives of 
those projects repeatedly tell us – is not just to operate some 
technical rules but to participate in a culture, to share preferences 
and inclinations shared with colleagues and institutions who 
identify themselves with that “box.”6 
The study of the EU has for a long time been its own field of specialization, its 
own special box, one which many international lawyers are reluctant to open. The 
literature on the EU’s place in the international legal order is then highly influenced 
by the intellectual community with which an author identifies. Simma and Pulkowski 
observe how “[o]ften, a scholar’s approach seems to depend on whether her 
intellectual home is the sphere of public international law or that of a specialized 
subsystem.” 7  A particular analysis may be shaped depending on whether one 
identifies as an EU or public international law expert: 
Public international lawyers generally presume the application of 
public international law and the character of the EU as an 
                                                                                                             
6 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal 
Education, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 8, 10-11 (2007). 
7 Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes, Responsibility in 
the Context of the European Union Legal Order, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 139, 
148 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
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international organisation (i.e. focusing on its formal sources), 
while EU lawyers tend to adopt the perspective of the EU as an 
autonomous legal order or even a self-contained regime, stressing 
its sui generis nature, allowing the substantive perspective to 
prevail in the evaluation.8 
The EU lawyer may see herself as part of a wider community that seeks to 
uphold and promote the European project, and therefore more willing to accept that 
the Union is somehow special or unique. In a similar way, many who view 
themselves as part of the community of international law cling to the notion of 
international law as a universally applicable system of rules. The idea that the EU is 
a ‘new legal order’ implicitly challenges this idea of universality and adds to anxiety 
over the fragmentation of international law.9 
From the EU law side, there is also a similar lack of engagement with the EU’s 
role in the international legal order. Much of the literature examining the EU’s place 
in international law falls into the category of ‘EU external relations law’.10Such 
literature engages with legal issues arising from the EU’s participation in the 
international legal order, focusing on internal questions regarding issues like the 
EU’s competence to conclude international agreements or to be represented in 
international institutions. Literature in this field remains inward-looking, debating 
legal issues facing the Member States and the institutions, but lacks self-reflection 
on the EU’s place within the wider international legal order. 
The effect of such academic specialisation and compartmentalization is that 
EU lawyers and international lawyers talk past one another. EU lawyers, for their 
part, tend to have a relatively well-developed and consistent idea of what the EU is. 
This ‘self-perception’ is discussed in more detail in Part II.A below.  International 
law scholarship, on the other hand, has far more difficulty conceptualising the EU. 
Part of this lies with the state-centric approach that still pervades international law. 
Schütze explains how international law’s assumptions that it is built on the sovereign 
state obscure the way it approaches ‘compound subjects’ such as the EU: 
Classic international law is built on the idea of the sovereign state. 
This State-centered structure of international law creates 
normative difficulties for non-State actors. The European Union is 
a union of States, and as such still encounters normative hurdles 
when acting on the international scene. These normative hurdles 
have become fewer, but there remain situations in which the Union 
                                                                                                             
8  Katja Ziegler, International Law and EU Law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalism and 
Fragmentation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 268, 
270 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., Edward Elgar 2011). 
9  See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002) (“[o]ne phenomenon that does contribute to fragmentation is 
the way the Union as an international actor is present in a number of different roles on the international 
scene.”). 
10 “The existing EU literature is mostly devoted to the study of the EU’s internal legal framework. 
As a result, analysis of the EU’s place in the international legal arena tends more often than not to be 
limited to the rules governing the EU’s external relations.” Anthony Valcke, Review: The European Union 
and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1051 (2003) (book review). 
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cannot externally act due to the partial blindness of international 
law towards compound subjects.11  
The study of the EU from an international law perspective suffers from a 
broader challenge within international law scholarship, that is, the inability to fully 
understand entities that do not neatly fit with existing categories such as ‘state’ or 
‘international organization’. The last three models discussed in the following section 
demonstrate how international lawyers disagree on a number of key points. Does the 
EU remains a creature of international law at all, or has it developed into something 
else? Which rules of public international law are to be applied to this kind of entity, 
and to what extent (if at all) should they be modified or adapted to take into account 
the EU’s special status? Is the EU truly an autonomous actor on the international 
plane, separate from its Member States, as it often claims? Or does the EU simply 
represent the collective will of its members, each of which remain fully sovereign 
subjects of international law. Whereas the EU lawyer has a relatively robust 
understanding of how to conceive the EU legal order, international law scholarship 
diverges on these and many other points.  
B. Divergent views of Kadi 
This divergence was most clearly on display in the academic response to the 
line of Kadi judgments from the CJEU.12 In this famous line of case law, the CJEU 
found that it was capable of exercising judicial review regarding EU measures that 
intended to implement UN sanctions. They are widely viewed as setting the EU’s 
relationship with the wider international legal order. Not only did the judgments 
spark intense scholarly debates among EU law experts, there was also an intense 
response and debate in international law scholarship, especially from many scholars 
outside Europe. This article does not intend to re-litigate these arguments. Rather, it 
illustrates how the diverging reactions to the case law can be explained partly by the 
legal audience.13 To many international lawyers, it was not so much the outcome in 
Kadi that raised issues, but the rather blunt way in which the Court dealt with 
international law. 14  While many praised the outcome of the judgment for its 
protection of human rights norms, it also led to a great deal of critical responses, 
mostly from those looking at the legal dispute from an international law 
perspective.15 The judgment tended to downplay the important and special character 
                                                                                                             
11 ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
12Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 
EU:C:2008:461. 
13 An edited volume on the Kadi ‘trial’ includes separate sections on the ‘public international law 
perspective’ and ‘constitutional perspective’. MATEJ AVBELJ ET AL., KADI ON TRIAL: A MULTIFACTED 
ANALYSIS OF THE KADI TRIAL (Routledge 2014). 
14 Supra note 12, at ¶ 316.  (For example, the Court refers to the Charter of the United Nations as 
merely an ‘international agreement’: “…the review by the Court of the validity of any Community 
measure in the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community based 
on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal 
system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.”). 
15 Grainne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi 
II, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2010); see Peter Margulies, Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The U.N. 
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of the UN system for peace and security, and to over emphasise the separateness of 
the EU from that the wider legal order. The following criticism summarises the view 
of many from the international law perspective: 
This decision [Kadi ECJ] overlooked the fact that the relevant 
human right to a fair trial is not absolute (unlike the prohibition on 
torture) and therefore could be derogated from in certain 
circumstances. This is essentially what the UN Security Council 
had done due to the threat posed by terrorism. Of serious concern 
is that the ECJ did not recognise that is was the court of a regional 
organisation and that, under the UN Charter, all EU Member 
States (who are also UN Members) were legally hound by Chapter 
VII resolutions of the Security Council. The Court therefore, and 
presumably knowingly, set up an important confrontation with the 
United Nations.16 
Given the complex and controversial issues that were dealt with in these cases 
it is understandable that this scholarship is also marked by such divergent views. But 
this divergence does not stem only from disagreements about the interpretation of 
the UN Charter or the status of certain human rights norms; it also stems from a more 
fundamental disagreement about the EU’s very legal character. In the quote above, 
the author stresses that the CJEU is a “court of a regional organisation”. The legal 
analysis that follows is shaped by this perception. The EU lawyer begins her analysis 
from a different starting point and set of assumptions, that is, the EU as autonomous 
legal order. According to this perspective, the legal dispute is somewhat 
straightforward: the CJEU was called upon to decide whether the legal instrument 
before it – an EU regulation – was compatible with EU law.17 The CJEU decided 
that since this regulation, an instrument of secondary law, breached fundamental 
rights in the EU legal order, the regulation was invalid. The fact that this regulation 
happened to implement a UN Security Council resolution could not alter the fact that 
the regulation violated fundamental rights, which form part of the “very foundations 
of the Community legal order”.18 The international lawyer, on the other hand, has a 
different starting point: the assumption that the EU is an intergovernmental 
organization founded on treaties. 19  The analysis that follows is similarly 
                                                                                                             
Terrorist Sanctions Regime After Kadi II 6 AMSTERDAM L.F. 2, 51 (2014) (arguing that the Court failed 
in Kadi II to display the appropriate level of deference to Sanctions Committee decisions). 
16 ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010). 
(emphasis added).  
17 P.J. Cardwell, D. French & N.D. White, Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals, 58 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 229 (2009). “… the reason that the Kadi judgment should not be characterised as radical 
is because it reflects the long-standing view of the Court that the EU legal system is an autonomous legal 
framework independent of, and not reliant upon, public international law.” 
18 Supra note 12, at ¶ 304.  
19  Pellet points out that “les Communautés comme, d'ailleurs l'Union européenne, ont été créées par 
des traités; ce sont ces traités qui fondent leur personnalité juridique; et un traité est un instrument 
juridique international. Dès lors, les Communautés et l'Union sont, avant toute chose et peut-être 
exclusivement, des personnes du droit international.” Alain Pellet, Les Fondements Juridiques 
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straightforward: the EU Member States have an obligation to implement UN 
Security Council Resolutions and Article 103 of the UN Charter gives clear 
precedence to these obligations in case of conflict. The fact that the EU Member 
States happened to implement their obligations through an international organization 
does not alter the fact that they remain bound by their obligations under the UN 
Charter. In each case, the different starting points and assumptions lead to the use of 
different legal tools, which then leads to different legal results. 
Of course, the examples discussed above are overly simplified 
characterisations of much more complex and nuanced positions. Yet they serve to 
identify how the assessment depends upon one’s starting point, and which legal 
narrative about the EU is accepted. There is nothing novel in pointing out that the 
legal assessment of lawyers depends on their points of reference20 or foundational 
assumptions.21 Yet such disagreement and divergence cannot be explained simply 
by academic specializations and backgrounds. In the following section I argue that 
four main views of the EU have emerged about the legal identity of the EU. I then 
demonstrate how these different views also have legal effects in practice.  
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE EU IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FOUR MODELS 
A. The Union’s Self-Perception: A ‘New Legal Order’ of International Law 
It is now well-established that the CJEU conceives the Union as a ‘new legal 
order’, holding in van Gend en Loos that the EEC Treaty was “more than an 
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting 
states”.22 The Court continues to apply the logic of the ‘new legal order’ in its legal 
reasoning. In Opinion 2/13, before finding that an agreement designed to allow for 
the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights was incompatible 
with the EU Treaties, the CJEU recalled its mantra: “the founding treaties of the EU, 
unlike ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its 
own institutions, for the benefit of which the Member States thereof have limited 
their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not 
                                                                                                             
Internationaux du Droit Communautaire, in 5 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN 
LAW 193, 201 (1997). 
20 Cardwell, French & White, supra note 17, at 240 (pointing out how Kadi “highlights a growing 
sense of divergence in opinion between EU and public international lawyers, especially in terms of our 
respective normative ‘points of reference’—in the case of EU lawyers, the EU treaties, in the case of 
international lawyers, the UN Charter.”). 
21 Christian Tomuschat, The Kadi Case: What Relationship is There Between the Universal Legal 
Order Under the Auspices of the United Nations and the EU Legal Order?, 28 Y.B. EUR. L. 654, 655 
(2009). 
22 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 EU:C:1963:1, 
12 (Feb. 5, 1963). 
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only those States but also their nationals.”23 The Court continues to invoke this 
“shibboleth”24 in its judgments in various and sometimes surprising ways.25 
This model of the EU as a ‘new legal order’ is closely linked with the EU’s 
own self-perception and identity. It is one of the foundational myths used to construct 
the elements of the EU legal order. 26 Like national myths, it does not matter whether 
the ‘new legal order’ is technically or historically correct – rather, the account 
provides a useful symbolic narrative of the polity’s construction and self-identity. 
The Court continued to put in place some of the cornerstones of EU law, including 
the notions of direct effect and primacy, in part, by building upon the new legal order 
narrative, which tends to set EU law apart from ‘ordinary’ international law.27 The 
Court could have conceivably derived EU law principles such as direct effect and 
primacy by referring to existing public international law principles, such as 
customary rules of treaty interpretation.28  Concepts such as supremacy and primacy 
pre-date the Union and its Court, and have been described as an “appropriate 
synonym of pacta sunt servanda”29, a fundamental principle of the law of treaties.30 
As Denza points out: 
Contrary to what is sometimes suggested, the ECJ did not invent 
the doctrine of direct effect, which can be traced back to rulings of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and to cases in 
European jurisdictions, but it did lay down criteria to be uniformly 
applied throughout the European Community. It is this uniformity 
                                                                                                             
23 Opinion 2/13, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft international agreement, 2014 
EU:C: 2014:2454 (Dec. 18, 2014).  
24 Isiksel, supra note 3, at 571. 
25 Tomuschat, supra note 21, at ¶ 39. 
26 “[I]l n’est nul besoin de se raccrocher au mythe de la rupture totale du droit communautaire par 
rapport au droit international général pour rendre compte de sa spécificité, qui est réelle et profonde. En 
réalité, l'ordre juridique communautaire, ancré dans le droit international, y trouve l'essentiel de sa force 
et de ses caractéristiques.” Pellet, supra note 19, at 268.; “[O]ne of the greatest received truisms, or myths, 
of the European Union legal order is its alleged rupture with, or mutation from, public international law 
and its transformation into a constitutional legal order.”  J.H. Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of 
the Community Legal Order–Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 420 (1996); see 
Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, The Social Construction of Law: The European Court of Justice and 
Its Legal Revolution Revisited, 7 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 417, 426 (2011).  
27 As Lowe points out, the CJEU “imagined into existence an entire new, legal order, hammering 
into place the other great beams of that legal order, such as the supremacy of Community law…” Vaughan 
Lowe, The Law of Treaties; or Should this Book Exist?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 3, 6 (Christian J. Tams, et al., eds., Edward Elgar 2014). 
28 Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International Law and National Law in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 411, 415 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 4th ed., 2014). “This formulation of the 
supremacy of Community law – not self-evident on the face of the European Community Treaties – is 
among the features distinguishing European Community law from international law.”; see Bruno de Witte, 
Retour à “Costa” La Primauté du Droit Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit International, in NOI SI 
MURA 257 (Werner Malhofer ed., 1984). 
29 Ole Spiermann, The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European 
Community Legal Order, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 766, 785 (1999). Spiermann argues that “compared to other 
parts of the international law of cooperation, there is nothing new about direct effect and nothing 
innovative about precedence.” Id. at 787.  
30 De Baere and Roes argue that they are founded on the duty of loyalty. Geert De Baere & Timothy 
Roes, EU Loyalty as Good Faith, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 829, 840 (2015). 
 
225 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [VOL. 33:2 
which is one of the most striking features distinguishing European 
Community from public international law.31 
In this sense it is not the unique features of the Union that set it apart from other 
polities, but the degree to which the Union possesses and exercises these features.32  
As de Witte argues:  
the effort to sharply separate the EU from the field of international 
law might be misguided for two complementary reasons: because 
it overestimates the novelty of EU law, and because it 
underestimates the capacity of international law to develop 
innovative features in other contexts than that of European 
integration.33  
The Court did not use public international law as a building block of the EU 
legal order, but built these new concepts in contradistinction to international law. In 
order to do this it had to caricature international law as relatively weak and 
unenforceable.34 EU law, on the other hand, could be superior to national law and 
capable of direct effect, since the Member States had created a ‘new legal order’. 
EU lawyers now largely accept the ‘new legal order’ narrative developed by 
the Court. Those who deal with EU law in day-to-day practice do not imagine 
themselves working with a ‘creature of international law’35 but in what resembles in 
most respects a national legal order. The EU may have international law origins and 
its constitution is formally an international legal instrument,36 but this is largely 
irrelevant to the lawyers in Brussels and London working on state aid and 
competition law. This does not mean that questions of legal character do not have 
legal significance. More complex questions arise when this new legal order narrative 
                                                                                                             
31 Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International Law and National Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 411, 428 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 2010).  
32 “Some people say that the EU is unique – that it resembles no other entity and, in its concept and 
design, owes nothing to anything found anywhere else. That is not true. Although the breadth and depth 
of its powers put the EU in a special position, this is merely a matter of degree. The EU is simply the 
foremost among a whole pack of international bodies that have the power to control what countries do.” 
TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS xv 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
33 Bruno de Witte, The European Union as an International Legal Experiment, in  THE WORLDS OF 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 19, 20-21 (Gráinne de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2011). 
34  “Par ses faiblesses intrinsèques, le droit international public diffère profondément du droit 
communautaire. Plusieurs traits du droit international sont ainsi devenus, par contraste, d'utiles repères 
pour apprécier la spécificité du droit communautaire et, par là même, pour mesurer l'écart qui s'est creusé 
entre les deux orders juridiques.” OLIVIER JACOT-GUILLARMOD, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 258 (Librairie de l'université Georg 1979). 
35  Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible 
Foundations, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 389, 403 (1996). “At least at its inception, the European Community 
was clearly a creature of international law. As there are no indications that a revolution in its legal sense 
has subsequently occurred … the European Treaties are still creatures of international law.” 
36 Barents argues, for instance, that “[a]lthough the EC is based on a document which bears the name 
‘treaty’, this has but a formal meaning. In a material sense the EC Treaty has the character of an 
autonomous constitution and, as a result, it constitutes the exclusive source of Community law.” RENÉ 
BARENTS, THE AUTONOMY OF COMMUNITY LAW 112 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2004). 
 
2018] CONCEPTUALISING THE EUROPEAN UNION   226 
is applied, not just to the relationship between the EU and its Member States, but to 
understand the EU’s relations with third parties.  
1. The EU as sui generis  
Closely tied to the ‘new legal order’ narrative is the description of the EU as a 
sui generis entity.37 Stating the EU is sui generis tells us that it is a unique creature, 
but nothing whatsoever about the legal consequences that flow from this. Like ‘new 
legal order’ it is also a malleable concept, which can be used in different situations 
to mean different things. The idea is that the EU is so special, so different from other 
forms of political and legal organization that it simply does not fit in any existing 
category of international or constitutional law.38 Since the EU is not a state, and does 
not neatly fit easily among classical international organizations, there is a tendency 
to attach the label sui generis as some kind of mid-way category. 
For most international lawyers, however, the idea that the EU fits into its own 
legal category is inaccurate at worst or unhelpful at best. 39   It is not a helpful 
conceptual model, but an “unsatisfying shrug’”.40 Schütze is highly critical of the sui 
generis ‘theory’.41 The first line of argument is that the term is conceptually useless 
– it cannot be used to analyse or measure the Union and its evolution. Moreover, the 
sui generis theory is an entirely negative one; the label only tells us what the EU is 
not, but does nothing to describe what type of polity the EU is, or how international 
law should apply to it. 42   The second argument is that the sui generis label is 
inaccurate: “the sui generis ‘theory’ is historically unfounded. All previously 
existing Unions of States lay between international and national law.”43 As discussed 
                                                                                                             
37  EU Law and International Law, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 208 (B. Van Vooren & R.A. Wessel eds. Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
38 de Witte, supra note 33, at 20. De Witte summarizes the view of many EU lawyers: “the dominant 
strand in the EU law literature takes the view that the European Union, whilst not a federal state, is also 
no longer and international organizations, but rather an ill-defined sui generis legal construct.”;  De Baere 
similarly describes the EU is a sui generis legal concept, and that “cannot be fitted easily within either 
constitutional or international law…” GEERT DE BAERE, CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EU EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 32, at 20, De Witte summarizes the view of many EU lawyers: 
“the dominant strand in the EU law literature takes the view that the European Union, whilst not a federal 
state, is also no longer and international organizations, but rather an ill-defined sui generis legal 
construct.”;  De Baere similarly describes the EU is a sui generis legal concept, and that “cannot be fitted 
easily within either constitutional or international law…” GEERT DE BAERE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).  
39 Denza points out that “European lawyers are given to saying that the European Union is sui 
generis—which is true but not helpful.”  EILEEN DENZA, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLARS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
40 Hay argues that the notion of sui generis “not only fails to analyze but in fact asserts that no 
analysis is possible or worthwhile, it is fact PETER HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: PATTERNS FOR NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES 44 (Ill. Univ. Press 1966). 
41 SCHÜTZE, supra note 11, at 67. 
42 BARENTS, supra note 35, at 45-46.  Barents argues that “[T]here exists only a consensus about 
what Community law does not represent (constitutional or international law). However, this conclusion 
offers no explanation about the nature of Community law. In particular, it does not provide answers to 
fundamental questions …” 
43 SCHÜTZE, supra note 11, at 67. 
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above, many of the supposed unique features of the Union which are put forward in 
favour of the EU being sui generis, can be found in entities outside the context of the 
EU. 
Terms like ‘new legal order’ and sui generis were adopted because 
international law and constitutional law were missing the vocabulary to describe an 
entity such as the EU. International lawyers tend to have an aversion to the sui 
generis concept, in part because it could imply that general international law should 
not, or cannot, apply to it. The international landscape consists of not just States but 
a highly heterogeneous array of complex legal structures and diverse entities. Could 
the WTO, with its unparalleled role in world trade and unique dispute settlement 
system be described as sui generis? Could the UN Security Council – which has no 
counterpart in the realm of international peace and security– also be described as sui 
generis? A completely negative definition such as sui generis tells us nothing about 
how international law should approach the subject.44 
Some point out the distinctive features of the EU legal order, pointing to issues 
such as direct effect and supremacy; the position of individuals; the exercise of 
governmental powers by EU institutions; the role of the Court of Justice in 
interpreting and applying EU law; the inability of Member States to enforce EU law 
through traditional countermeasures;45 and so on. The reply to this will often be that 
these are all features that make the EU distinctive, but cannot alter the EU’s character 
as an international organization. 46  The fact that the EU is a well-developed or 
complex legal order does not mean that its character as a legal order of international 
law is lost.47  The common story is that the EU was originally conceived using 
international law instruments, but it has since transformed into something else which 
fits neither into the realms of international nor municipal law.48 This ‘something else’ 
was described as sui generis. 
International lawyers have often questioned the ‘new legal order’ and sui 
generis models. One reason for this is that such conceptions imply that the EU is not 
only a highly distinctive legal order, but also an exceptional one. Being unique can 
imply special treatment. This has given rise to discussion of so-called ‘European 
exceptionalism’,49 a term has been given multiple meanings in the literature. Some 
refer to European exceptionalism as a form of double standards. 50  Isikiel, for 
instance, understands this exceptionalism as the Union seeking to release itself from 
international standards based on its “purported fidelity to principles of human rights, 
                                                                                                             
44 Bruno de Witte, The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law: the EU and 
its Member States as Strange Subjects, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-54. (J. 
Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E. De Wet ed., 2008).  
45 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2422 (1991). 
46 See Timothy Moorhead, European Union Law as International Law, 5 EUR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
126, (2012) (arguing that “the Union legal order is essentially one of international law.”).  
47 Id. 
48 Weiler and Haltern point out that “[t]here is no doubt that the European legal order started its life 
as an international organisation in the traditional sense, even if it had some unique features from its 
inception.” Weiler & Haltern, supra note 26, 419. 
49 George Nolte & Helmut Aust, European Exceptionalism?, 2 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 407, 
416 (2013).  
50 Gráinne de Búrca, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor, 
105 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 649, 690 (2011). 
 
2018] CONCEPTUALISING THE EUROPEAN UNION   228 
democracy, and the rule of law.” 51  Nolte and Aust 52  and Ličková 53  view 
exceptionalism more in the sense of the EU justifying certain legal exceptions for 
itself, both in its own case law, but also in its legal relationship with third States. 
Both understandings of exceptionalism flow from a common idea that the EU is not 
just distinctive, but special. One consequence of this is that other states and 
organizations “have to arrange themselves with particularities of the special status of 
the EU.”54 Such claims of exceptionalism can be seen in the CJEU’s reasoning in 
Opinion 2/13.  The following section discusses how the ‘new legal order’ narrative 
in this judgment was a starting point that shaped the ultimate legal outcome. 
2. Opinion 2/13 and the New Legal Order Narrative 
In Opinion 2/13 the Full Court of the CJEU decided that the Draft Accession 
Agreement, designed to allow the EU to join the ECHR, was inconsistent with EU 
law. The Court based its Opinion, in large part, on the idea of the EU as a ‘new legal 
order’:  
“The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of 
which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and 
founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional 
structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has 
consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of 
accession to the ECHR.”55  
Here the Court is using this new legal order narrative and the concept of 
autonomy to approach the question of how and under which conditions the EU can 
participate in an international convention. 
Opinion 2/13 came as a surprise and was met with heavy criticism.56 Not only 
academics, but also the EU institutions and EU Member States, were of the view that 
the Accession Agreement was compatible with the EU Treaties. One of the reasons 
for such a sharp divergence of views is the diverging view of the EU’s legal 
character. Academic discussion following Opinion 2/13 has focused on the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
51 Isikel, supra note 3 at, 566, n.4. 
52 Nolte & Aust, supra note 49, at 418.    
53 Magdalena Ličková, European Exceptionalism in International Law, 19 EUR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
463 (2008). 
54 “The argument is advanced that no other group of states has pooled sovereignty to the degree that 
EU member states have done. No other entity would have brought about such a distinct form of 
supranational governance which also acts alongside its member states on the international level. This 
would have particular consequences on the international level, for instance when other states have to 
arrange themselves with particularities of the special status of the EU.” Nolte & Aust, supra note 49, at 
431. 
55 Opinion 2/13, supra note 23, ¶ 158. 
56 Some of this criticism includes: Isiksel, supra note 3; Editorial Comments, 52 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1-16 (2015); B. de Witte, Š. Imamović, Opinion 2/13 on Accession to the ECHR:  Defending the EU 
Legal Order Against a Foreign Human Rights Court, 40 EUR. L. REV. 5, 68 (2015); T. Locke, The Future 
of the European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is 
it Still Possible and is it Still Desirable?, 11 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 239, 243 (2015). 
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analysis of particular aspects of the Accession Agreement. While the Court 
expressed its disapproval of the draft agreement through a discussion of technical 
details, the more fundamental disagreement was about the very nature of the EU and 
its legal order. One passage of the Opinion is particularly illuminating in this regard:  
The approach adopted in the [Accession Agreement] envisaged, 
which is to treat the EU as a State and to give it a role identical in 
every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, specifically 
disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU and, in particular, fails to 
take into consideration the fact that the Member States have, by 
reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that relations 
between them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of 
powers from the Member States to the EU are governed by EU law 
to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law.57 
The CJEU is not just critical of the Accession Agreement, but of the very 
‘approach adopted’ by its drafters. These drafters approached the EU from the 
perspective of an international organization (see section II.CC below). According to 
this approach, the EU was to be treated in the same manner as other contracting 
parties, unless there was a clear reason to treat the EU differently. The Accession 
Agreement introduced certain innovations – the co-respondent mechanism and prior 
involvement procedure, for example  –  but these were exceptions designed to protect 
the autonomy of the EU legal order. For the most part, the EU was to be treated as 
another contracting party. Such an approach was an anathema to the Court. The 
starting point should not have been the EU’s equality, as the drafters believed, but 
its exceptionalism. 
The EU’s self-conception as a ‘new legal order’ gives rise to problems when 
the EU seeks to apply that model to its relationship with other States and international 
organizations. Why should other members of the Council of Europe accept that the 
EU is to be afforded special treatment due to the CJEU’s understanding of the EU as 
an autonomous legal order? The CJEU did not demand certain tweaks or adjustments 
to the Accession Agreement, but called for its redesign, based on the EU’s autonomy 
and special characteristics. No such special treatment is afforded to any other 
contracting states to take into account, for example, their sovereignty or 
constitutional idiosyncrasies. Isiksel points out how “these questions throw into high 
relief why characterizing the EU as a sui generis entity is, in addition to being 
analytically unsatisfactory, politically and normatively problematic.” 58  The new 
legal order narrative makes sense only as long as it is applied in the internal sphere, 
to regulate the relations between the EU Member States and the institutions. 
Problems arise when the Court asserts its conception of autonomy – an ill-defined 
and malleable concept – must also apply to the EU’s participation in the international 
legal order.  
                                                                                                             
57 Opinion 2/13, supra note 23,  ¶ 193 (emphasis added).  
58 Isiksel, supra note 3, at 577. 
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B. The EU as a ‘Self-contained Regime’ 
The second model is the conception of the EU as a ‘self-contained regime’. 
Like the new legal order narrative, this model accepts the autonomy of the EU, but 
unlike the new legal order narrative, it still accepts that the EU is very much a part 
of the wider international legal order. According to one definition, a system can be 
considered ‘self-contained’: 
if it comprises not only rules that regulate a particular field or 
factual relations laying down the rights and duties of the actors 
within the regime (primary rules), but also a set of rules that 
provide for means and mechanisms to enforce compliance, to 
settle disputes, to modify or amend the undertakings, and to react 
to breaches, with the intention to replace and through this to 
exclude the application of general international law, at least to a 
certain extent.59 
A self-contained regime is a ‘sub-system’ of international law; it not only 
regulates a certain sphere of activity, but also contains its own secondary rules, 
largely or completely replacing the application of general international law. Some 
examples of self-contained regimes that have been put forward include the legal 
system of the World Trade Organization, the regime of diplomatic law, and various 
systems in international human rights law. One of the characteristics of a self-
contained regime is that, since they possess a complete system of rights and 
remedies, there is no ‘fall-back’ to general rules. This is based on the concept of lex 
specialis – states are free to establish a sub-system of legal rules that is more 
specialised and displaces the application of general rules. The ILC study on 
Fragmentation of International Law recognized that a system may develop into a 
self-contained regime over time: 
The establishment of a special regime in the wider sense (S.S. 
Wimbledon, any interlinked sets of rules, both primary and 
secondary) would also normally take place by treaty or several 
treaties (e.g. the WTO “covered treaties”). However, it may also 
occur that a set of treaty provisions develops over time, without 
conscious decision by States parties, perhaps through the activity 
of an implementing organ, into a regime with its own rules of 
regime-administration, modification and termination.60 
The ILC’s study lists ‘EU law’ as a candidate for a possible self-contained 
regime.61 The EU has been described as “the most convincing example of a self-
contained regime”62  and there are a number of very strong arguments that the EU 
                                                                                                             
59 Eckart Klein, Self-Contained Regime, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, available at opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).  
60 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, ¶ 157.  
61 Id. at ¶ 129. 
62 Klein, supra note 59; Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 7, 152. 
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should be considered as such. The main reason is that Union law provides an 
exhaustive system to deal with breaches of the EU Treaties.63 It is now clear that EU 
Member States may not resort to traditional inter-state countermeasures against other 
Member States for breaches of EU law, excluding a key aspect of pubic international 
law from the powers of the Member States. 64  From a public international law 
perspective, the concept that general international law does not apply within scope 
of the EU Treaties, is a revolutionary development. As Weiler points out, this is one 
of the key features that sets the EU legal order from international law: 
The Community legal order … is a truly self-contained legal 
regime with no recourse to the mechanism of state responsibility, 
at least as traditionally understood, and therefore to reciprocity and 
countermeasures, even in the face of actual or potential failure. 
Without these features, so central to the classic international legal 
order, the Community truly becomes something new.65 
While there appears to be no more room for inter-state countermeasures in the 
EU legal order, Simma and Pulkowski argue that these could still exist in certain 
narrow ‘emergency’ situations. These are (i) the continuous violation of EU law by 
a Member State and (ii) state to state reparation for breaches of EU law.66 Even in 
these hypothetical scenarios, resort to public international law would only take place 
because the EU system would have effectively failed. The argument is that Member 
States have only given up their rights to institute inter-state countermeasures to the 
extent that the procedures under EU law remain effective. In these situations, there 
would be a ‘fallback’ to the general system of state responsibility. One could argue 
that since international law can continue to operate as such a ‘fallback’, this would 
imply that the EU is not fully self-contained system.67 
                                                                                                             
63 Kuijper argues that upon establishing the European legal order, “[a]mong the Member States … 
general international law is no longer applicable within the scope of ‘the Treaties.’’ Pieter Jan Kuijper, 
“It Shall Contribute to ... the Strict Observance and Development of International Law” The Role of the 
Court of Justice in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND 
PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 589, 594 (A. Rosas, E. Levits, Y. Bot eds., 2013). 
64 See, e.g., Judgment in Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium, Joined cases 90/63 and 91/63, 
EU:C:1964:80, 631, in which the Court found the principle of exceptio non adimpleti conctractus 
(enforcement of an obligation may be withheld if the other party has itself has failed to perform the same 
or related obligation) could not be applied in the EU legal order.  
65 Weiler, supra note 45, at 2422. 
66  Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 483, 518 (2006).  
67 See Gerard Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States, 
13 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 3, 679, 695 (2002), concluding that “[d]espite the uniqueness and 
comprehensiveness of the system created by the European Communities, it remains the case that the term 
‘self-contained regime’, strictly understood, cannot be applied to it.”  Ziegler, supra note 7, 285. “… in 
principle, secondary norms of international law (for example of the law of treaties or state responsibility) 
remain available as a subsidiary fall-back position, because the EU Treaties foresee no mechanism beyond 
the penalty payments in Art 260 TFEU (ex Art 228 EC), leaving scope, for example, for the suspension 
of the Treaty in regard to a Member State according to Art 60(2) lit. a) VCLT which is in material breach 
of an obligation. This implies that the EU is not a fully self-contained regime.” 
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International law tends to treat claims of self-containment with caution. As 
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz pointed out, “[g]enerally, the specialists in 
Community law tended to consider that the system constituted a self-contained 
regime, whereas scholars of public international law showed a tendency to argue that 
the treaties establishing the Community did not really differ from other treaties…”.68 
Indeed, whenever States create an international organization they decide to create 
new legal relationships between themselves and derogate (to a certain extent) from 
general international law.69 Another reason that the self-contained regime label may 
be resisted is that it is viewed as contributing to the fragmentation of international 
law, caused by “the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or 
rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice.”70 The consensus on 
the topic seems to the be that, while the EU is probably the closest thing to a ‘self-
contained regime’, the application of public international law has not been 
completely excluded, and international law would apply in order to solve problems 
not addressed by the Treaties, or to fill gaps. This means that the EU “… is very 
close to a genuine self-contained regime, but even here the umbilical cord to general 
public international law has not yet been cut.”71 
Like the new legal order and sui generis narratives, the ‘self-contained regime’ 
model has little explanative value, especially when understanding the EU’s 
relationship with other legal entities. Presenting the Union as a self-contained or 
closed system of law only describes how principles of public international law should 
apply within the EU legal order. The next section discusses how some of these 
tensions have appeared during the legal debates in the United Kingdom related to its 
withdrawal from the European Union. 
1. The Brexit Debate 
The question of whether EU law is a ‘self-contained regime’ is not only an 
academic exercise, but can have legal consequences for the EU and its Member 
States. The question of whether EU law provides a complete system of remedies and 
whether a fallback to principles of public international law are appropriate has 
already been discussed in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Brexit 
will give rise to further questions about the EU’s legal character.  
On 29 March 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May officially gave notice 
under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of the United Kingdoms’ 
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intention to leave the European Union.72 This notice was given only after British 
Parliament passed the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act (2017)73 
earlier in the month, giving the Prime Minister the power to give formal notice to the 
Council of the European Union.  However, the UK Government without having 
involved British Parliament. This gave rise to litigation the High Court of England 
and Wales, and eventually the UK Supreme Court, on whether the British Parliament 
had to be consulted before Article 50 could be triggered.  
R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Miller case) 
ostensibly did not involve issues of public international law or even EU law; it 
involved a UK constitutional law question about the role of Parliament and the 
powers of the executive. Yet Miller did address these questions tangentially by 
focusing questions on the legal character of the Union. The EU’s legal character is 
not only defined by the CJEU and EU institutions, it is also co-shaped through other 
judicial institutions at multiple levels. This includes the legal systems of the EU 
Member States, which are a key part of the EU legal order.74 
The UK Government had argued that there was no constitutional requirement 
to involve Parliament in invoking Article 50 TEU because such a step – the 
withdrawal from a treaty – is customarily done via royal prerogative. As the 
Government argued before the High Court: “[s]uch a notification [under Article 50 
TEU] would be an administrative act on the international law plane …”75  The 
argument was the EU Treaties are, after all, international treaties, at least from the 
viewpoint of UK law. When withdrawing from these instruments, it was argued, the 
UK should follow its standard constitutional practice. Yet such a view overlooks the 
fact that when the UK joined the EU, the EU legal order had already transformed 
into something else, the constitutional foundations of a system that has in time 
become closely entwined with British law, and confers rights upon individuals.  
On 24 January 24, 2017 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
Divisional Court on appeal by an 8-3 majority.76 One of the key issues influencing 
its decision on the issue of Article 50 TEU notification was the EU’s legal character 
and the nature of EU law. The High Court acknowledged that “in normal 
circumstances”77 the withdrawal from a treaty on behalf of the UK would be a matter 
for the Crown. In the case of leaving the European Union, however, this would not 
                                                                                                             
72 Letter of 29 March 2017 from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the President of the 
European Council, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/pdf (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Letter to the European Council].  
73 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, 2017, c. 9 (U.K.).  
74  “…the tasks attributed to the national courts and to the Court of Justice respectively are 
indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law established by the Treaties.” Opinion 1/09, 
EU:C:2011:123, ¶ 85. 
75 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, Detailed Grounds of Resistance 
on Behalf of the Secretary of State, Sept. 2, 2016, ¶ 5.  
76 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
77 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) 
(Q.B.), [94] (Eng. & Wales), ¶ 30: “as a general rule applicable in normal circumstances, the conduct of 
international relations and the making and unmaking of treaties on behalf of the United Kingdom are 
regarded as matters for the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative powers.”  
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only produce legal effects on the international plane, but would also have the effect 
of modifying domestic law, including the rights enjoyed by residents in the UK.78  
The Supreme Court also notes the unique nature of the EU Treaties and the 
way in which EU law is given effect in the UK legal order. EU law is a “dynamic, 
international source of law”:  
The EU Treaties as implemented pursuant to the 1972 Act were 
and are unique in their legislative and constitutional implications. 
In 1972, for the first time in the history of the United Kingdom, a 
dynamic, international source of law was grafted onto, and above, 
the well-established existing sources of domestic law: Parliament 
and the courts.79 
The Supreme Court found that EU law is a “source of UK law.”80 The European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA 1972) is not the only Act that gives effect to 
international instruments; in a dualist system such as the UK legislation is required 
to give legal effect to international treaties. The ECA 1972 goes much further, 
however, since it authorises a process by which “EU law not only becomes a source 
of UK law, but actually takes precedence over all domestic sources of UK law, 
including statutes.”81 In this way the ECA 1972 acts as a “conduit pipe”82 between 
European and British legal systems. The Court acknowledges, therefore, that it is not 
just the ECA 1972 that is unique, but also the EU legal order to which it is linked.  
Given the nature of EU law as an independent source of law, the British Government 
could not through an act of royal prerogative ‘switch off’ the effects of EU law by 
withdrawing from the EU Treaties.  
Miller shows the divergent views about the nature of the EU and the EU legal 
order. The Court finds that the EU Treaties are not a form of ordinary international 
law. This contrasts with the approach of the British Government, whose starting 
point was that the EU Treaties remain instruments that produce effects on the 
international plane and are not a direct source of law in the UK. The dissenting 
judges in Miller also had a different conception of the EU and EU law. Lord Reed 
rejects the doctrine developed in Van Gend en Loos, stating that it “is incompatible 
with the dualist approach of the UK constitution, and ultimately with the fundamental 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.” 83   To Lord Reed, EU law is not an 
independent source of law, but one that remains on the international plane, and is 
given effect via the ECA 1972.84 
                                                                                                             
78 Miller (UKSC), supra note 75, ¶ 69: “Although article 50 operates on the plane of international 
law, it is common ground that, because the EU Treaties apply as part of UK law, our domestic law will 
change as a result of the United Kingdom ceasing to be party to them, and rights enjoyed by UK residents 
granted through EU law will be affected.”  
79 Id. ¶ 9  
80 Id. ¶ 60.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. ¶ 65.  
83 Miller (UKSC), supra note 75, ¶ 182, Dissenting Opinion of Lord Reed.   
84 Id. ¶ 17. According to Lord Reed (dissenting), the ECA 1972 “simply creates a scheme under 
which the effect given to EU law in domestic law reflects the UK’s international obligations under the 
Treaties, whatever they may be.”   
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This is another example of how the legal result in a case can turn on the starting 
point taken.  In Miller, the legal identity of the EU played an important role.85 In a 
commentary on the Article 50 process, Eeckhout and Frantziou point out: 
Article 50 raises important constitutional concerns not only for the 
withdrawing state - an issue that thrives in the UK blogosphere - 
but also from the perspective of the EU and its identity as a new 
legal order that creates rights and duties and safeguards them 
through accountable institutions, rather than being merely an 
international treaty signed by states. 86 
The legal arguments in Miller were focused on issues of UK constitutional law. 
Yet behind this dispute lies divergent views on the EU’s legal identity. The ECA 
1972 is a statute of constitutional significance. However, this is not only because UK 
law decided that this would be the case, but also because the EU has evolved into a 
dynamic and independent source of law.  
2. Can Article 50 Notification Be Revoked? 
Another legal question that has been debated since the Brexit referendum is 
whether notification under Article 50(2) TEU, once given, might be revoked. The 
question was not addressed directly in the Miller judgment, since it was agreed by 
both parties that Article 50 TEU notice “cannot be given in qualified or conditional 
terms and that, once given, it cannot be withdrawn.”87 This is an assessment of a 
number of legal commentators. 88  I disagree with this assessment. If the United 
Kingdom and the other 27 EU Member States all decided that the UK should not 
leave the European Union, it is difficult to envisage a scenario whereby Article 50 
would force the UK to leave against its will. The question is whether notice can be 
revoked unilaterally. 
                                                                                                             
85 As Elliott argues, the differing views in Miller illustrates “fundamentally different views about 
the constitutional status that EU law has (and will, until Brexit, continue to have) within the UK’s legal 
system.” Mark Elliot, Analysis: The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller, PUBLIC LAW FOR EVERYONE 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/01/25/analysis-the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-
miller/.  
86 See Piet Eeckhout & Eleni Frantziou, Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading 41 
(UCL Eur. Inst., Working Paper, 2016). (Emphasis added).  
87 Miller, supra note 76, ¶ 26. 
88 “Most commentators argue that [unilateral revocation] is impossible or at least doubtful, from a 
legal point of view. Indeed Article 50 TEU does not expressly provide for the revocation of a notice of 
withdrawal and establishes that, once opened, the withdrawal process ends either within two years or later, 
if this deadline is extended by agreement.” Eva-Maria Poptcheva, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 577.971) 5 
(2016). This analysis does not rule out the possibility of suspending withdrawal, with the agreement of 
the EU Member States and institutions. “The first point to note about Article 50 is that it is a once-and-
for-all decision; there is no turning back once Article 50 has been invoked.” Nick Barber, Tom Hickman 
& Jeff King, Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role, U.K. CONST. L. ASS’N 
(June 27, 2016), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-
pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role.  
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Article 50 TEU itself does not give any answer. For some, the absence of any 
possibility to revoke in the Treaties does point to an answer – had the drafters 
intended it to be revocable, this argument assumes, they would have included such a 
possibility in the text. Such an argument was put forward in arguments before the 
High Court: 
Article 50 is deliberately designed to avoid any such consequence. 
There is no mention of a power to withdraw.  And the very 
possibility of a power to withdraw a notification would frustrate, 
again, Article 50(3), which sets out in the clearest possible terms, 
what the consequences are of giving the notification under Article 
50(2).89 
Yet one might make a similar argument that Article 50 TEU does not mention 
revocability since such a right exists under public international law. Article 65 of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides a procedure with respect 
to invalidity, termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty, 
and Article 68 sets out that “a notification or instrument provided for in article 65 or 
67 may be revoked at any time before it takes effect.”90 If one accepts this provision 
represents customary international law, then it is binding upon the Union and its 
Member States. The UK would therefore have the right to withdraw its notice at any 
point up until withdrawal takes effect.91 The first argument sees Article 50 TEU as 
setting out the complete picture regarding the process of withdrawal. Since there is 
no explicit mention of revocability, it is not possible under the EU Treaties. The 
second argument, however, sees that Article 50 TEU is to be supplemented by public 
international law when the EU Treaties are vague or unclear. 
The answer, again, depends on the legal character of the EU. If one views the 
EU as a ‘self-contained regime’ the EU Treaties are a complete system of rights and 
remedies and there should be no recourse to general international law when deciding 
upon a legal question within the sphere of EU constitutional law. Indeed, one could 
argue that by including a withdrawal procedure in the EU Treaties, the drafters 
intended to set out the entire procedure that should take place in case of a Member 
State choosing to leave, replacing the application of public international law. One 
could make the case that in the EU context, the rules of public international law are 
not appropriate, since the legal consequences of a Member State leaving are so 
extreme, not only for the Member State, but also for the remaining EU Member 
States. 
Such an approach to Article 50 TEU would be to unnecessarily burden the 
United Kingdom and the other EU Member States. The drafters of Article 50 could 
not have possibly envisaged all the types of legal issues that might arise through a 
                                                                                                             
89 R v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] UKSC 5 (CO) 16-17 (appeal taken 
from Eng.).    
90 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
91 See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF LORDS, The process of withdrawing from the 
European Union Supplementary written evidence—Professor Derrick Wyatt QC  (2016) PLE0001 (UK), 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/european-union-
committee/the-process-of-leaving-the-eu/written/32079.html. 
 
237 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [VOL. 33:2 
process of a Member State leaving. The ‘self-contained regime’ model should not be 
applied so as to remove any flexibility. Indeed, the CJEU has shown a certain 
openness to the application of international law where the EU Treaties are silent. In 
Hungary v. Slovakia the CJEU implied that public international law (the status of a 
Head of State) still applies in the relations between the EU Member States, and has 
not been completely supplanted by the EU legal order. 92 While EU law and the EU 
Treaties must be the starting point when analysing such issues, there is no reason to 
exclude the application of principles of the law of treaties (and other rules of 
customary international law) where appropriate.   
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will continue to give rise to questions under 
UK national law, EU law and international law.93 Resolving these legal issues will 
also involve questions related to the legal identity of the EU.  As James Crawford 
noted, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will expose the ‘hybrid character’ of the 
EU: 
 
There is considerable tension within the EU legal order between 
the underlying international law framework of treaties, and the 
internal law of the EU, which is not intentional law in any 
straightforward sense.  But when negotiating within the EU for a 
situation outside it, the hybrid character of the EU is very much in 
issue.94 
C. The EU as a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) 
The third model is that of the EU as a ‘Regional Economic Integration 
Organization’ (REIO). The two models discussed above – the EU as a ‘new legal 
order’ and the EU as a ‘self-contained regime’ – relate to the nature of the EU’s 
internal legal order. They tell us little about how the EU is to relate with other 
subjects of international law, or where it fits within this wider international legal 
order. The REIO model seeks to address that question. This model accepts that the 
EU is unique in many ways but reiterates that it still belongs to the world of 
international organizations. This is perhaps the most common view among 
international lawyers: the EU is an international organization, albeit one with certain 
distinct features. 
This conception of the EU is reflected in a number of international treaties 
which allow for participation of the EU. Only a small number of treaties specifically 
mention the EU as a party;95 most allow for participation of ‘regional economic 
integration organizations’ (REIO), or alternatively (recognizing the EU’s 
                                                                                                             
92 Case C-364/10, Hungary v. Slovakia, 2012 E.C.R. 49.   
93 See generally Jed Odermatt, Brexit and International Law: Disentangling Legal Orders, 31 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1051 (2017). 
94 James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 MOD. L. 
REV. 1, 16 (2018). 
95 For example, the EU was a founding member of the WTO. Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994). 
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competence beyond economic matters) ‘regional integration organizations’ (RIO).96 
The European External Action Service’s Treaties Office Database shows that the EU 
is a party to 91 international agreements containing an ERIO clause.97 According to 
this model, the EU is first and foremost and international organization. While some 
may reject the description of the EU as an ‘international organization’, the EU has 
accepted the REIO label by joining international agreements and participating in 
international organizations via REIO clauses. On the one hand, the REIO model 
accepts that the EU is an international organization when it acts on the international 
plane. On the other hand, it also reflects the idea that such an organization is different 
from the classical form of intergovernmental organization, reflecting somewhat the 
EU’s self-conception of a unique type of legal entity.  
1. REIOs Before the International Law Commission 
Is a REIO a distinct type of international organization for the purposes of 
international law? The EU has argued at the International Law Commission (ILC) 
that specialized rules should be developed with respect to REIOs.  
The ILC has on many occasions been faced with questions regarding which 
rules of international law apply to subjects other than States. An early example of 
this can be found in the ILC’s Waldock Report, referring to the EU in the context of 
succession of obligations of states. The question arose as to what type of entity the 
EU is according to international law. Waldock draws a sharp distinction between 
unions of States, which aim to create a new entity on the international plane (e.g. the 
UN or Council of Europe) and unions intended to create a new political entity on the 
plane of internal constitutional law (e.g. US, Switzerland or the former United Arab 
Republic). The European Union, however, does not easily fit within either of these 
categories: 
“For the present purposes, it must suffice to say that, while EEC is 
not commonly viewed as a union of States, it is at the same time 
not generally regarded as being simply a regional international 
organisation. The direct effects in the national law of the member 
States of regulatory and judicial powers vested in Community 
organs gives EEC, it is said, a semblance of a quasi-federal 
association of States. Be that as it may, from the point of view of 
                                                                                                             
96  Art. 44, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2518 U.N.T.S. 283 (2008). 
“Regional integration organization” shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given 
region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this 
Convention.” 
97  Inventory of Agreements Containing the Regional and International Organization Clause, 
European Union External Action Treaties Office, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/ClauseTreatiesPDFGeneratorAction.do?clauseID=30 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
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succession, EEC appears without any doubt to remain on the plane 
of intergovernmental organisation.”98 
The ILC’s Study on the Fragmentation of International Law points out “the 
European Community […] is a subject of international law and for practical purposes 
may be treated towards the outside world as an intergovernmental organization, with 
whatever modification its specific nature brings to that characterization.”99 The ILC 
has had to deal with the legal character of the EU in a number of codification projects. 
For example, when the ILC embarked on its project on the International 
Responsibility of International Organizations, it included the European Union in its 
work, implying that the EU is to be treated as an IO for the purposes of international 
law. 100  The evident problem with this approach is that it considers the EU alongside 
a host of different types of international organizations that share very few 
characteristics with the EU apart from the fact that they were established by an 
international treaty. The EU and some legal commentators questioned the usefulness 
of dealing with entities as diverse as the European Union, International Monetary 
Fund and World Meteorological Organization in one set of draft articles.101 The 
European Commission, representing the Union, consistently argued that any draft 
articles must take into account the special nature of the EU legal order. Rather than 
frame this argument around the unique nature of the EU, however, the European 
Commission argued that the ILC should consider the EU as a REIO, for which a 
different set of rules had developed.102  
The academic literature on the international responsibility of the EU 103  is 
marked with the same set of divergent views as discussed in the introduction. 
International lawyers tend to discuss international organizations generally, and 
include the discussion of the EU in that analysis. According to this view, secondary 
rules of responsibility should be capable of applying to all international 
organizations irrespective of their particular type, including the EU. The other view 
in the literature (often written by EU lawyers or those working in the EU institutions) 
focuses on the EU itself, and discusses the particular issues arising from the nature 
                                                                                                             
98  Succession of States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/256, at 18 (1972), 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24, U.N. Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1972/Add.1. (Emphasis added). 
99 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, ¶ 219.  
100 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries; Rep. of 
the Int’l L. Commission, on its Sixty Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 52; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10 (2011). 
101 See Jan Klabbers, Self-control: International Organizations and the Quest for Accountability, in 
(eds), THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 76 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., Hart Publishing 2013) “surely, it will not do 
to have an identical regime for entities as disparate as the World Bank, the EU, and say, the European 
Forest Institute; hence to the extent that organisations welcome a general responsibility regime, they 
nonetheless feel that their situation is different.” 
102 See generally J. Odermatt, The Development of Customary International Law by International 
Organizations, 66 INT’L COMP. L. QUART. 491 (2017). 
103 See, e.g., A. DELGADO CASTELEIRO, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION FROM COMPETENCE TO NORMATIVE CONTROL (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); THE 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., Hart Publishing 2013). 
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of the EU and the EU legal order.104 Much of this second strand of literature is 
inward-looking, focusing on internal legal issues such as competences and mixity, 
rather than situating the EU among other international organizations. It is 
unsurprising that the latter strand of literature endorsed more EU-specific rules in the 
draft articles.  
This cleavage in the academic literature could also be seen played out within 
the ILC. Of the many conceptual issues the ILC and the Special Rapporteur faced 
when developing the Draft Articles, one of the most perplexing was how to find a 
set of universally-applicable rules that could be applied to a highly diverse set of 
international bodies. The European Commission consistently argued that the draft 
articles had to take into account the unique nature of the Union, specifically its role 
as a REIO.105  Indeed, the European Commission was sceptical about whether it 
would be possible or desirable to have rules applicable to all international 
organizations, given the high degree of diversity of international organizations that 
exist.106 From the outset the European Commission highlighted the unique nature of 
the EU: 
 
the EC is regulated by a legal order of its own, establishing a 
common market and organizing the legal relations between its 
members, their enterprises and individuals. Legislation enacted 
under the EC Treaty forms part of the national law of the Member 
States and thus is implemented by Member States’ authorities and 
Courts. In that sense, the EC goes well beyond the normal 
parameters of classical international organizations as we know 
them. It is important that the ILC draft articles should fully reflect 
                                                                                                             
104 Pieter Jan Kuijper & Esa Paasivirta, EU International Responsibility and its Attribution: From 
the Inside Looking Out, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 35 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., Hart Publishing, 2013); 
Esa Paasivirta and Pieter Jan Kuijper, Does One Size Fit All? The European Community and the 
Responsibility of International Organizations, 36 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 169 (2005); Martin 
Björklund, Responsibility in the EC for Mixed Agreements – Should Non-Member Parties Care?, 70 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 373 (2001); Christian Tomuschat, The International Responsibility of the European 
Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 177 (Enzo Cannizzaro 
ed., Kluwer 2002); Pieter Jan Kuijper & Esa Paasivirta, Further Exploring International Responsibility: 
The European Community and the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of International Organizations, 1 INT’L 
ORG. L. REV. 111 (2004); Frank Hoffmeister, Litigating against the European Union and Its Member 
States – Who Responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723 (2010). 
105 See supra note 99. 
106 “The European Commission expresses some concerns as to the feasibility of subsuming all 
international organizations under the terms of this one draft in the light of the highly diverse nature of 
international organizations, of which the European Community is itself an example.” Comments and 
Observations Received from International Organizations, [2008] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 32, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/593. 
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the institutional and legal diversity of structures that the 
community of states has already established.107 
These comments build upon the idea of the EU as “a rather specific 
international organization.”108 The European Commission argued that, given this 
special nature, specialised rules were needed to take this into account in the draft 
articles. It was also argued that “concepts such as ‘regional economic integration 
organization’ have emerged in the drafting of multilateral treaties, which seem to 
reflect some of these special features.”109 For example, the European Commission 
argued that special rule of attribution should be included “so that responsibility could 
be attributed to the organization, even if organs of member states were the prime 
actors of a breach of an obligation borne by the organization.” 110  Despite the 
arguments put forward by the European Commission, as well as much of the 
academic commentary, the ILC did not support the idea that any specialised rules of 
attribution had developed regarding the Union.111  Rather than develop a set of rules 
applicable to REIOs only, the ILC chose instead to develop rules that applied equally 
to all international organizations, irrespective of their type or categorization. The ILC 
arguably did allow the diversity of international organizations to be taken into 
account through the inclusion of a lex specialis rule,112 which sets out that general 
rules of responsibility may be supplemented by more specific ones. This provision 
could potentially allow for the development of specialised rules in the context of the 
European Union.113 
The REIO/RIO model of the EU accepts the EU as an international 
organization but implies that the EU possesses certain unique features that should be 
taken into account. However, as illustrated from the ILC’s draft articles of 
                                                                                                             
107  Giuseppe Nesi, EU Presidency Statement – Report of the International Law Commision, 
EUROPEAN UNION @ UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 27, 2003), http://eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_2940_en.htm. 
108 “The European Commission attaches great importance to the work of the International Law 
Commission, but necessarily looks at it from the perspective of a rather specific international 
organization.” Comments and Observations received from International Organizations, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/568, at 127 (May 12, 2006).  
109  Comments and Observations received from International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545, 
at 28 (June 25, 2004). 
110  Observations of Mr. Kuijper (Observer for the European Commission), Sixth Committee, 
Summary Record of its 21st Meeting, UN Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.21, at ¶18 (2014). 
111  Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Second Report on 
Responsibility of International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/541, at 5-8 (2004). 
112 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with Commentaries, in Rep. 
of the Int’l Law Commission, on its Sixty Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 100.  “These articles do 
not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act 
or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization, or a 
State in connection with the conduct of an international organization, are governed by special rules of 
international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization 
applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members.” 
113 Id. “By way of illustration, it may be useful to refer to one issue which has given rise in practice 
to a variety of opinions concerning the possible existence of a special rule: that of the attribution to the 
European Community (now European Union) of conduct of States members of the Community when they 
implement binding acts of the Community.”; but see Jean d’Aspremont, A European Law of International 
Responsibility? The Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations and the European 
Union, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 75-76 (Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris & Vassilis 
Tzevelekos eds, Hart Publishing 2014). 
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responsibility of IOs, is far from agreed upon what, precisely, these unique features 
are, and the extent to which they should be relevant for the purposes of identifying 
rules of international law. 
D. The EU as a (Classic) International Organization  
The final model is that of a classic intergovernmental organization. This view 
downplays the unique characteristics of the EU and the constitutional character of 
the EU Treaties. It accepts that the EU has certain unique features, but rejects that 
this sets it apart as a qualitatively different entity other international organizations or 
groups of states. Viewing the EU as ‘just another’ international organization may be 
conceptually appealing to many international lawyers who see the 
compartmentalisation of international organizations into discrete categories as a 
threat to the universal application of international law. Orakhelashvili reminds us 
that the EU is an international organization: 
It is true that there is a substantive difference between the 
European Union and other international organizations as the 
former possesses specific aims of European integration and 
extensive powers to bind Member States and their nationals to that 
end. However, there are no consistent criteria for constructing a 
workable juridical distinction between supranational organizations 
and international organizations, especially in relation to general 
international law. Being a supranational organization means also 
being an international organization.114 
The Classic IO model also dismisses arguments in favour of EU 
exceptionalism. It goes against the EU’s self-perception as a ‘new legal order’. Some 
describe the EU as an ‘association of states’ 115  which also tends to deny the 
characteristics of the EU as a distinct legal entity in its own right. In some instances, 
the EU is referred to as a ‘bloc’, which presents the EU as a group of like-minded 
countries, rather than an organization with its own personality and powers.  
EU lawyers would reject such characterizations. As discussed above, even if 
the EU is technically founded on international law instruments, they would argue, 
treating the EU as an international organization is not helpful as an analytical tool. 
Yet they should be reminded that outside of the EU, the Union continues to be 
viewed in such a manner. We can see such a divergence of views in international 
forums where the EU Member States are in minority, such as at the United Nations 
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343 (2006). 
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CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 175 (LexisNexis, ed., Butterworths 2006). 
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General Assembly.116 Here the EU is not viewed as a special or unique entity. It is 
viewed as an international organization or a political bloc. When the EU gained 
‘enhanced observer’ status at the UN General Assembly in 2011, the UN Press 
Release described the Union as a ‘bloc’.117 Since the EU gained such observer status 
in the UN system, the Union has had difficulty asserting itself as an independent 
legal entity, separate from its Member States. This of course is explained more by 
political than legal reasons – States that are not members of the EU may be sceptical 
or hostile to the idea of European states gaining greater power within multilateral 
bodies through separate membership of the EU. But this shows how the EU’s own 
self-perception, that of a unique type of supranational organization, is not accepted 
universally, not least in many of the multilateral bodies where the EU seeks to 
enhance its participation and visibility. 
III. THEORIZING THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHARACTER 
The previous section outlined four views of the European Union that exist in 
the international and EU law. Using examples from recent legal practice, it showed 
that these views are not confined to academic literature. It showed how legal 
outcomes are shaped, in part, by which model is taken as a starting point in a given 
circumstance. Moreover, the legal identity of the EU is shaped, not only by the CJEU 
and the EU institutions, but also the judicial systems of the EU Member States, and 
at other levels, such as the International Law Commission or UN General Assembly. 
What are we to make of these diverging views? Which of these models is correct? 
It is tempting for legal scholars to seek a single ‘answer’ to this question. The 
EU is not a subatomic particle that exists in multiple states or whose character 
depends on the observer. It is a legal entity. It enters into international agreements 
and appears before courts. In order to resolve some of the most complex legal 
issues—the responsibility of the EU, the legal fallout from Brexit, the EU’s 
participation in multilateral fora, and so on – there should be a consistent 
understanding about what type of legal entity the EU is. 
There is a tendency to argue that everything is relative and that the answer to 
this question will always be a matter of perspective and the standpoint of the 
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Adam eds., Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014). 
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Granting European Union Right of Reply, Ability to Present Oral Amendments, U.N. Press Release 
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would have the ability to exercise the right of reply, restricted to one intervention per item.”). 
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observer. 118   In its ‘Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability’ in 
Electrabel SA v. The Republic of Hungary, the arbitration tribunal was called upon 
to decide whether EU law should be considered international law, for purposes of 
defining the applicable law. The Tribunal noted the ‘multiple nature’ of EU law, 
stating that “EU law is a sui generis legal order, presenting different facets depending 
on the perspective from where it is analysed. It can be analysed from the perspectives 
of the international community, individual Member States and EU institutions.”119 
The tribunal cites two academic articles to demonstrate that ‘many scholars’ accept 
that “EU law is international law because it is rooted in international treaties.”120 
This reasoning feeds into the idea that the nature of the EU and EU law depends on 
the legal domain in question – national courts, EU courts, or international tribunals. 
It stresses that EU law can exist in multiple states.  
The description of the EU legal order as “un ordre juridique interne d’origine 
internationale”121 used by Advocate General Maduro in Kadi I seeks to capture the 
duality of the EU legal order, one with international law origins and dimensions, but 
with municipal, even constitutional, characteristics. Crawford and Koskenniemi also 
seek to capture the ‘dual nature’ of the EU legal order as one that is both international 
and domestic in nature:  
In certain cases, of which the European Union is the best example, 
a legal system originating in a treaty and dependent on standard 
international law techniques for its origin and development, may 
come to seem – may actually be – sufficiently distinct as to 
constitute a separate legal system, linked to the international legal 
system, participating in it, but with its own ‘reserved domain’ and 
its own rules of recognition. But even with the European Union 
this is only provisionally the case: the member states generally 
treat it as a kind of international organisation, and as only by 
delegation exercising state authority.122 
This recognizes that the EU legal order has both an internal and external 
dimension. Which model we apply in a given case will depend on which dimension 
is being discussed. Gardiner captures this internal/external dichotomy in relation to 
the EU: 
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In its internal aspect, that is viewing relations between the member 
states themselves, the Community is an organism for collective 
exercise of sovereignty in matters over which competence is 
transferred to the Community by treaty. In its external aspect, the 
Community functions as an international organization, entering 
into treaties in matters within its competences.123 
In its internal dimension, the EU can be thought of as a constitutional legal 
order, one that regulates the rights and responsibilities of the EU Member States in 
their mutual relations. From this perspective, it makes sense to treat the EU as new 
legal order or self-contained regime. At the external level, when the EU participates 
on the international scene and mediates with other subjects of international law, these 
descriptions lose their value, and the EU is best treated as an international 
organization. 
Such an approach might be conceptually appealing. It allows the CJEU and EU 
lawyers to continue with the ‘new legal order’ narrative, since this only applies in 
the internal sphere, while at the same time mollifies fears of some international 
lawyers that the EU is seeking special treatment or undermining the universality of 
the international legal order. However, it is unlikely that such a strict dichotomy can 
always work well in practice. Take, for instance, the legal dilemma that arose in 
Opinion 2/13. One could argue that the new legal order narrative was justified 
because the legal issue concerned the EU’s internal legal order: whether a proposed 
accession agreement complies with EU law. However, this would ignore the fact that 
the case involved an external dimension too, since it dealt with the EU’s interaction 
with other legal subjects and participation in another legal order (the ECHR system). 
By requiring the EU to obtain a high level of special treatment from the other ECHR 
contracting parties, the CJEU made it difficult for the EU to accede in practice. By 
viewing the dispute as one that involves the purely internal dimension, the Court 
overlooked the wider context of the dispute.124 As was discussed above, one of the 
reasons that Opinion 2/13 remains controversial is that involved a clash of two very 
different views of the EU and EU law. As the EU seeks to participate in the 
international legal order – through trade agreements, dispute settlement mechanisms, 
or via participation in international organizations and processes – it is likely that such 
clashes will arise in the future. 
The relativistic approach – that the legal character of the EU depends on the 
legal domain in question – is also problematic in that it reduces legal certainty. For 
international law to work effectively, it must be possible for it to be applied 
consistently across different situations and to different subjects of international 
law.125 The legal characterisations of the EU in any circumstance will often reflect 
deeper power relations. Where the EU is in a stronger position, it will be able to 
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assert its ‘new legal order’ narrative. However, where it sits beside 193 members of 
the UN, it is less likely to dictate to others that it is unique and requires special 
treatment. If one applies this relativistic approach, legal outcomes will be shaped, in 
part, by these power dynamics. It is difficult, therefore, to develop a consistent 
conceptual model since legal arguments about the legal nature of the EU are closely 
entwined with political debates about the EU’s place in the international legal order.  
Is this really a problem? One might argue that the international legal character 
of the EU has, and always will be, the subject of contestation and debate, but this has 
rarely given rise to serious problems in practice. Academics and lawyers will 
continue to debate the nature of the EU in lengthy articles and at academic 
conferences, but the real world will move on. This article has argued, however, that 
such theoretical disagreements can have practical consequences. One should 
remember that the ‘new legal order’ narrative, while now accepted for the most part 
within the EU, was also subject to decades of debate and contestation. The debate 
today is no longer whether the EU is an autonomous legal order but whether this 
autonomy can be applied at the international level to the EU’s relationships with third 
states and international organizations. The EU’s self-perception continues to be 
challenged when it steps out into the world. It is unlikely that the EU will be 
successful in convincing third states that the EU is qualitatively different and requires 
international law to take into account this status. As the EU seeks to increase its 
interaction at the international level, and as one Member State seeks to extricate itself 
from the EU legal order, we are likely to see the question of the EU’s legal character 
come up again. 
